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I. INTRODUCTION
Challenging the regulation of indecent speech makes for a sexy First
Amendment case. Concerns with chilling or censoring speech draw
immediate attention, overshadowing the issue of how the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) exercises its discretion when it finds
certain language "indecent." In 1978, the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, Inc. held that the FCC's regulation of indecent speech
did not violate the First Amendment.' Having the constitutional authority to
regulate indecent speech, however, is distinct from identifying which
actions are appropriate in the exercise of that authority. Until recently, too
little attention has been given to the latter query: whether the FCC's
indecency regulation is arbitrary and capricious.
Regulating indecent speech requires sensitivity and discretion in
evaluating the contemporary offensiveness of language; concepts of
offensiveness change over time. The FCC's authority to regulate indecent
speech primarily originates in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.2 The FCC defines
indecent speech under § 1464 as "material that, in context, depicts or
describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium."3 This standard explicitly recognizes a focal point in the
history of profanity and foul language (including indecent speech) by
1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (holding that
broadcasting indecent speech has more limited First Amendment protection due to its
uniquely pervasive presence in society and because it is uniquely accessible to children).
Without making light of their significance, the constitutionality of the FCC's indecency
regime, and related arguments concerning the strength and validity of Pacifica's holding,
are beyond the scope of this analysis.
2. § 1464 provides that "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). See also 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (2000)
(authorizing the revocation of station license or building permit for violation of § 1464); 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(D) (2000) (authorizing the "imposition of forfeiture[s]" for violating §
1464).
3. Complaints Regarding Various TV Brdcsts. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8,
2005, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, para. 15 (2006) [hereinafter Order on Remand).
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Geoffrey Hughes, a professor of the history of the English language.4
Hughes identifies the weakening or loss of intensity of the force and impact
of swear words over time as the dominant trend in the history of swearing.5
A corollary to weakening is the shift in meaning from one that is sexually-
charged and/or offensive to one that reflects general use. For example,
about three decades after the emergence of the term "jerk" as a verb
meaning "to masturbate" in the late nineteenth century, it developed into a
common noun meaning "an offensive or worthless person."' 6 The linguistic
development of "jerk" demonstrates that over a relatively short period of
time, the sexual activity described by a term can dissipate into a widely-
used term with no inherent coarse, sexual meaning.
The Supreme Court's review of the Second Circuit's decision in Fox
v. FCC presents an important issue addressing the administrative
discretion exercised in the indecency regime. In 2004, the FCC announced
the "fleeting expletives" policy-that the isolated use of an offensive
expletive could be actionable.8 After Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS
Broadcasting, Inc., and NBC Universal, Inc. (collectively, the Networks)
challenged the fleeting expletives policy, the Second Circuit held the policy
change invalid as an arbitrary and capricious abuse of agency discretion.9
In the wake of the Supreme Court grant of certiorari in Fox v. FCC, the
Third Circuit, in CBS v. FCC, found arbitrary and capricious the "fleeting
images" policy the FCC articulated to sanction the February 1, 2004
exposure of Janet Jackson's breast during the Super Bowl.'0
An undercurrent in the Second and Third Circuit cases is that the
FCC's freewheeling indecency regulation fails scrutiny under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706.11 The abuse of
discretion found by the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals is
ostensibly limited to the policy changes involving fleeting expletives and
fleeting images. The FCC's implementation of those policies, however,
appears to fall prey to the same factors that support the arbitrary and
4. GEOFFREY HUGHES, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SWEARING: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF
OATHS, PROFANITY, FOUL LANGUAGE, AND ETHNIC SLURS IN THE ENGLISH SPEAKING WORLD
(2006).
5. Id. at 300, 302.
6. Id. at310-11.
7. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct.
1647 (2008).
8. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 7.
9. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 447.
10. CBS Corp. v. FCC, No. 06-3575, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16692, at *3-4, *32-34
(3d Cir. July 21, 2008).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law....").
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capricious finding in Fox v. FCC. In other words, Fox v. FCC and CBS v.
FCC begin to suggest that neither the recent indecency policies nor the
findings may survive APA review. In that light, the administrative law
question the Court faces regarding fleeting expletives represents the tip of
the iceberg: upholding the court of appeals' decision in Fox v. FCC would
have the effect of bringing the entire indecency regime under fire, while
reversing the court of appeals bolsters the FCC's ability to restrict speech
in broadcasting and also would cause greater unpredictability in speech
regulation.
This Note thus examines the FCC's indecency regime through the
lens of the scope of judicial review for arbitrary and capricious
administrative actions. Part II provides a brief overview of the issue
presented to the Supreme Court by the Second Circuit's recent decision in
Fox v. FCC. Part III looks at the standard applied by the FCC to determine
if certain language is indecent. Part IV examines the standard for judicial
review in finding whether or not an administrative action is arbitrary and
capricious. Part V compares the arguments raised by Fox v. FCC for and
against finding the FCC's indecency regime arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, Part VI suggests that the optimal conclusion is to uphold the court
of appeals' decision, and proposes an alternative indecency policy that
scales back discretion and incorporates a factual foundation to ease
administration and to provide clearer guidance to broadcasters.
II. OVERVIEW
For many years after Pacifica was decided, the FCC consistently did
not find isolated, non-literal expletives actionably indecent. 12 That changed
in 2004, when the FCC abandoned that position and adopted the standard
that certain "fleeting expletives"-the broadcast of an isolated expletive
which is not repeated-are indecent under § 1464.13 In regulating fleeting
expletives, the FCC determined that certain words, namely "fuck" and
"shit," cannot be divorced from their sexual or excretory meanings, and
may be regulated even in isolated use. 14 In June 2007, the Second Circuit's
12. See, e.g., Pacifica Found. Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 2698,
para. 13 (1987) ("If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe that
under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently
offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.").
13. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at paras. 21-23. See also Complaints Against
Various Brdcst. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 12 (2004) [hereinafter Golden
Globes Order].
14. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 20.
[Vol. 61
INDECENCY REGULATION
decision in Fox v. FCC invalidated the FCC's fleeting expletives standard,
holding that it is arbitrary and capricious under the APA.15
Judge Leval's dissent in the court of appeals shrewdly noted that,
"if ... the Commission's actions are arbitrary and capricious because of
irrationality in its standards for determining when expletives are permitted
and when forbidden, that argument must be directed against the entire
censorship structure."' 6 Determining whether or not language is "patently
offensive" by "contemporary community standards" is the essence of
indecency regulation. 17 In finding the fleeting expletives standard arbitrary
and capricious, the Second Circuit did not reach the Networks' challenge
that the FCC's "community standards" analysis is also arbitrary.' 8 Since
FCC v. Pacifica, in 1978, which represented the first instance where the
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's regulation of indecent content in the
broadcast medium,' 9 the FCC has looked to Pacifica as support for finding
certain words patently offensive.20 Thus, despite the recognition that
standards of indecency change over time, the FCC's indecency analysis
gives short shrift to the problem of evaluating what language meets that
standard now, compared to when Pacifica was decided 30 years ago.
In November 2007, the Solicitor General filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari (Petition) to the Supreme Court on the FCC's behalf, asking the
Court to review the Second Circuit's decision in Fox v. FCC.2' The Petition
criticizes the court of appeals for placing the FCC in a position in which it
will have difficulty regulating isolated expletives based on the contextual
analysis, which will leave it ill-equipped to prevent "coarsening of the
airwaves. 22 However, this position begs the question by assuming that the
FCC will be unable to regulate indecent language. The real issue is whether
certain words are indecent, not based on context, but based on serious
consideration of contemporary community standards.
15. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
16. Id. at 471 (Leval, J., dissenting).
17. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 15.
18. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 454.
19. Indus. Guidance on the Comm.'s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Brdcst. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999,
para. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Industry Guidance].
20. See, e.g Complaints Regarding Various TV Brdcsts. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar.
8, 2005, Notice of Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664, para. 74 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order] (citing Citizen's Complaint Against
Pacifica Found., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975), for the
proposition that any use of the "F-Word" and "S-Word" falls within the first prong of the
FCC's indecency definition), vacated in part, 21 F.C.C. 13,299 (Nov. 06, 2006).
21. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647
(2008) (No. 07-582), 2007 WL 3231567.
22. Id. at 30.
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The question presented to the Supreme Court in Fox v. FCC requires
a hard look at the "fleeting expletives" standard, but the standard of review
for abuse of discretion has clear implications for the entire FCC indecency
23
regime. At the outset, it should be noted that the FCC's rationale for its
policy on fleeting expletives echoes its rationale for regulating indecency,
as articulated in Pacifica.24 Indeed, the Solicitor General likely conflates
the two for two reasons: to prompt the Court to adhere to the Pacifica
holding and to acknowledge that the decision implicates the entire
indecency regime.25 The FCC's Supreme Court brief highlights the
reasoned basis the APA requires for an administrative agency's actions, as
articulated by the Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass 'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.26 In its brief, however, the FCC misconstrues the judicial
gloss on arbitrary and capricious review-likening it more to a rational
basis review than to the hard look State Farm established. 7 The Court may
utilize a variety of factors in a State Farm review to support or negate a
reasoned basis for administrative action during judicial review for arbitrary
and capricious actions.28 How the Court applies those factors, and the kind
of deference it gives to the FCC, may determine not only the legitimacy of
the fleeting expletives policy, but of indecency determinations generally.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's guidance on whether the FCC's
fleeting expletives policy is arbitrary and capricious is needed because it is
a bellwether for the FCC's alignment with the APA for indecency
determinations. Resolving this question of administrative law should
brighten the line between indecent and permissible language, the
implications of which will provide guidance for broadcasters concerned
with chilled and censored content.
III. FINDING INDECENT SPEECH
The FCC's analytical approach to an "indecency finding[] involve[s]
at least two . . .determinations." 29 First, the speech must fall within the
FCC's definition of indecent speech by depicting or describing sexual or
23. See id. at 29 (noting that the court of appeals' decision "effectively nullifies the
prohibition on indecent language found in Section 1464").
24. See Brief for the Petitioners at 3-4, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (June
2, 2008), 2008 WL 2308909.
25. See id. at 17-18 ("The criticisms by the court of appeals.., have less to do with the
Commission's revised policy on isolated expletives than they do with the enterprise of
broadcast-indecency enforcement in general.").
26. See id. at 21 (referencing Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983)).
27. See id. at 21-22.
28. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42-43.
29. Industry Guidance, supra note 19, at para. 7.
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excretory organs or activities. 30 Second, and more importantly for purposes
of this review, the speech must be "patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium."'"
The FCC's Industry Guidance policy statement describes several
principal factors for measuring patent offensiveness. Considering the
context of the work as a whole is critical to the patent offensiveness
analysis. 32 The principal factors in the FCC's decisions are:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of
sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or
activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its
shock value.33
Despite folding contemporary community standards into these factors
for patent offensiveness, the consideration of the former receives some
discrete attention from the FCC.
It is difficult to divine what constitutes a satisfactory analysis of
contemporary community standards. In recent years, the FCC has stated
and reiterated that the "'community standards for the broadcast medium'
criterion ... is that of an average broadcast viewer or listener and not the
sensibilities of any individual complainant." 34 On the one hand, the FCC
recognizes the Supreme Court's guidance that the contemporary
community standards prong ensures that "material is judged neither on the
basis of a decisionmaker's personal opinion, nor by its effect on a
particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group." 35 On the other hand,
the FCC's determination of contemporary community standards is left open
by statements that "decisionmakers need not use any precise geographic
area in evaluating material," and "its evaluation of allegedly indecent
material is 'not one based on a local standard, but one based on a broader
standard for broadcasting generally.' 36 Therefore, the FCC's standard
moves away from particulars and approaches an abstract rather than a
factual determination, which provides tremendous discretion in
determining an artificial average community standard.
30. Id.
31. Id. at para. 8.
32. See id. at para. 9.
33. Id. at para. 10.
34. Id. at para. 8 (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., Memorandum and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, para. 10 (2000)).
35. Infinity Brdcst. Corp. of Pa., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 930,
para. 24 (1987) [hereinafter Infinity Broadcasting] (citing Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 107 (1974)).
36. Industry Guidance, supra note 19, at para. 8, n.15 (quoting Infinity Broadcasting,
supra note 35, at para. 24).
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The FCC's interpretation of the Supreme Court's guidance from
Hamling v. United States37 recognizes the importance of contemporary
community standards in evaluating allegedly indecent material, but the
determination of that criterion is hedged by statements that the issue will be
considered broadly. The FCC couched the issue of evaluating
contemporary community standards in a way that does not suggest, much
less require, precision in their evaluation. Accordingly, the contemporary
community standards criterion guards against subjective, arbitrary findings
of indecent material, but does not compel the FCC to engage in clear
factual evaluations of indecent material.
By framing the contemporary community standards evaluation with
such sweeping language, the FCC opens itself up to arbitrary exercises of
its regulatory power. Indeed, broadcast networks have criticized the FCC
for determining contemporary community standards based on the
Commissioners' subjective opinions.38 To respond to that criticism, the
FCC repeated its most definitive statement of how it determines
contemporary community standards.39 The November 2006 Order on
Remand cites a 2004 opinion and order which stated that the community
standard for the "average broadcast viewer or listener" is determined by
relying on the FCC's "collective experience and knowledge, developed
through constant interaction with lawmakers, courts, broadcasters, public
interest groups and ordinary citizens."40 The adequacy of that method of
determination certainly depends on which side of the equation the affected
party stands-for the FCC, it suggests that a wide range of sources is
considered, but for broadcasters, it is a rather opaque statement that
provides little guidance, and worse, it could reasonably be perceived to be
dressed-up language that boils down to the subjective predilections of those
in the FCC.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS
Originating in the APA, a reviewing court may set aside an agency
action, finding, or conclusion found to be arbitrary and capricious.4' The
judicial gloss on the APA's scope of review for arbitrariness is known as
37. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 107.
38. Joint Comments of Fox TV Stations, Inc., CBS Brdcst., Inc., NBC Universal, Inc.
and NBC Telemundo License Co. at 10-11, Remand of Section III.B of the Comm'n's
Omnibus Order, FCC DA 06-1739 (rel. Sept. 21, 2006).
39. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 28.
40. Id.; see also Infinity Radio License, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 5022, para. 12 (2004).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
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the hard look doctrine.42 Generally, the reviewing court looks to see if the
agency took a hard look at the question to determine if the agency's
decision making was adequate or inadequate, i.e., arbitrary and
capricious. 43 The Solicitor General seems to agree with the finding of the
court of appeals that the standard for judging fleeting expletives policy is
arbitrary and capricious.44 But considering the foundation for the fleeting
expletives policy discussed below, this analysis suggests further that the
current standard for the FCC's indecency determinations is arbitrary and
capricious under the hard look doctrine.
A. Development of the Judicial Gloss on Arbitrary and Capricious
Review
Absent the judicial gloss, the language of the APA does not provide
much guidance for a court reviewing an alleged abuse of administrative
discretion. The APA states that "[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law... "45 In 1983, the Supreme Court implicitly adopted
the hard look approach to arbitrary and capricious review in State Farm.4
Prior to State Farm, arbitrary and capricious review was relatively narrow,
and courts essentially reviewed agency actions under a reasonableness
standard.47 During the 1970s, the Court began to move toward the hard
look doctrine, notably in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,48
where the Court stated that the administrative agency "must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors and
whether there had been a clear error ofjudgnent."49
B. The State Farm Hard Look Standard
In State Farm, the Court held that the Secretary of Transportation's
rescission of Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious under the
42. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8335 (2006).
43. Id.
44. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21, at 10; see also Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 24, at 20 (describing the FCC's policy change as reasonable
explained so that it survives the arbitrary and capricious standard).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
46. See WRIGHT & KOCH, supra note 42, § 8335 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).
47. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 803 (2d ed. 2006).
48. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated by 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
49. AMAN, supra note 47, at 804 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
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APA.50 By the end of the 1970s, Standard 208 required the phasing in of
passive restraint systems in automobiles.5 ' In 1977, the Secretary of
Transportation issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive
restraints-namely automatic seatbelts or airbags-in large cars beginning
in 1982 and all cars by 1984.2 Four years later, however, difficulties in the
automobile industry led the Secretary to reconsider, and the passive
restraint requirement was rescinded. 3 The agency's reasons for the
rescission included no longer being able to find that the requirement would
produce significant safety benefits, and the costs of implementing would
not clearly justify the safety benefits-because most manufacturers opted
for automatic seatbelts which could be easily detached.5 4 The Court agreed
with the Department of Transportation that "a reviewing court may not set
aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant
factors," but nonetheless found that the agency failed to do so in its
decision to rescind Modified Standard 208.55
Justice White wrote for the five Justice majority on the arbitrary and
capricious finding, stating, "the agency has failed to offer the rational
connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster under the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard., 56 The Court noted "[t]he scope of
review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency., 57 However, the
opinion qualified the scope of review, stating that, "[n]evertheless, the
agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."'
58
The narrow arbitrary and capricious review requires looking at a
variety of factors to determine the adequacy of an agency's action. The
factors mentioned in State Farm include whether: (1) the agency articulated
a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, (2) the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
(3) there is a clear error of judgment, (4) the agency entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, (5) the agency offered an
50. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46
(1983).
51. See id. at 34-36.
52. Seeid. at37.
53. See id. at38.
54. See id. at 38-39.
55. Id. at 42-43, 46.
56. Id. at 56.
57. Id. at 43.
58. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
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explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or (6) the agency's conclusion is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.59 In
light of these factors, the Court further qualified this standard, stating that it
will "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned.
60
Further complicating matters, however, the Supreme Court, in
Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,6'
suggested the agency must take a hard look at the relevant facts and data
when making its initial decision.62 In State Farm, the Court took a hard
look at the relevant facts in the decision made by the agency. Baltimore
Gas thus provides a hard look that is more deferential to the agency
decision making by limiting review to whether relevant facts and data were
at play in the agency's decision, and if so, the court defers to the agency's
decision.
Overall, then, the language framing the arbitrary and capricious
standard allows the reviewing court to lean towards a reasonable, more
deferential standard or a more rigorous standard highlighting the hard look
factors enumerated in State Farm. Of course, the manner in which the
arbitrary and capricious review is employed depends not only on the
composition of the Court, but also on the facts of the particular case. As
Justice O'Connor noted in Baltimore Gas, "[w]hen examining . . . [a]
scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential., 63 It is not clear whether the
Court would characterize the nature of certain speech as more of a
scientific determination or as a simple finding of fact. For these reasons, it
is difficult to anticipate how the Court would apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard; however, it also reinforces the need for the Court's
guidance in the FCC's determination of the fleeting expletives standard and
the contemporary community standards.
59. See id. at 42-43.
60. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
61. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
62. Id. at 97-98 (requiring "only that the agency take a 'hard look' at the environmental
consequences before taking a major action.. .The role of the courts is simply to ensure that
the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions
and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.").
63. Id. at 103.
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C. The Scope of Arbitrary and Capricious Review Is Confused By
Many Because It May Take Several Shapes
Before considering how the Supreme Court may apply the hard look
doctrine in Fox v. FCC, an apparent confusion regarding the scope and
standard of arbitrary and capricious review must be flagged. Discussing the
standard of review in Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit,64 the Solicitor
General,65 and commentators 66 all suggest that the review looks for a
"reasoned basis." While State Farm mentions the need for a reasoned basis
for an agency's action,67 however, focusing on that phrasing out of the full
context of the opinion reads the scope of review too narrowly. The facts in
State Farm, discussed above, demonstrate that the Secretary of
Transportation rescinded Modified Standard 208 for practical and
economic reasons, but the Court's examination of the factual underpinnings
of the agency's action, in light of the statutory mandate, did not meet the
reasoned analysis standard required to survive arbitrary and capricious
68review. Interpreting the reasoned basis language in State Farm by its
plain meaning, thus, misconstrues the arbitrary and capricious standard.
The Supreme Court's current hard look at the indecency regime-as a
whole or limited to fleeting expletives-thus may take several shapes.
Applying the approach from the Overton Park/State Farm line of cases, the
Court may find the indecency determinations arbitrary and capricious for
several reasons, either independently or taken together. In the absence of
hard data for the FCC's determination of contemporary community
standards, the general question for the Court since Overton Park is whether
the FCC's cursory explanation of that determination is a consideration of
relevant factors or a clear error of judgment. Under State Farm, it is
possible for that to lead the Court to conclude that a lack of facts renders
community standards decisions arbitrary and capricious because there are
no facts found that can be rationally connected to the choice made.69
64. See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455, 458 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
65. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21, at 19; see also Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 24, at 20 (arguing that the FCC should survive arbitrary and
capricious review because the FCC gave a reasonable explanation for its policy change).
66. See, e.g., Julie Hilden, The Fight Over "Fleeting Expletives": How A Grant of
Supreme Court Review May Lead to Expanded FCC Power and Reduced First Amendment
Rights for Broadcasters, FINDLAW, Mar. 31, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/hilden/
2008033 l.html (stating that the reviewing court has to hold that the FCC failed to articulate
a reasoned basis for the policy in order to find it arbitrary and capricious under the APA-
"[n]ot 'reasonable' - simply 'reasoned').
67. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)).
68. See id. at 46-57.
69. See id. at 56.
[Vol. 61
INDECENCY REGULATION
Likewise, the absence of hard facts from the method of determining
community standards may suffice for the Court to find the standard
arbitrary and capricious due to clear error of judgment.7 ° Overall, the lack
of discrete facts makes it difficult to square the FCC's rather opaque
method of determining contemporary community standards into the
reasoned analysis required by State Farm, discussed above.
Alternatively, the Court may find that the indecency standard is not
arbitrary and capricious under either the State Farm or the Baltimore Gas
constructions of the hard look doctrine. In the simplest (and least helpful)
decision, the Court, under State Farm, will not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.71 The Court could punt on the issue by giving such bald
deference to the FCC, but it does not provide clarity or guidance for
indecency determinations. A less feeble decision would require the Court to
uphold the indecency regime by chalking up the determinations as an
acceptable product of agency expertise. The last point may be bolstered by
the Baltimore Gas approach, applying greater deference to the agency.72
Overall, though, an opinion deferring to the FCC's decision-making
process, however, would not provide guidance to the broadcast industry on
the contours of the current, rather haphazard approach to indecency
determinations.
V. Fox v. FCC: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOuS INDECENCY DETERMINATION
In Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit did not decide on the arbitrariness
of the FCC's contemporary community standards, despite the fact that it is
a critical factor to indecency findings. But the court's discussion of fleeting
expletives implicates the arbitrary and capricious nature of the current
indecency regime. The Networks successfully argued to the Second Circuit
that the FCC's November 2006 Remand Order is arbitrary and capricious
under the APA "because the FCC has made a 180-degree turn regarding its
treatment of 'fleeting expletives' without providing a reasoned explanation
justifying the about-face. 7 3 To reach its conclusion, the Second Circuit
addressed the FCC's basis for indecency determinations and its reasons for
the change in policy.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 43.
72. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-
98 (1983).
73. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
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A. The FCC's Reasons for Moving To Regulate Fleeting Expletives
To explain its change in policy to regulate fleeting expletives, the
FCC supplied the same reasons it has given for regulating indecent
language since Pacifica. According to the Second Circuit, "[t]he primary
reason for the crackdown on fleeting expletives advanced by the FCC is the
so-called 'first blow' theory described in the Supreme Court's Pacifica
decision. 74 In Pacifica, the Court rejected an "avert your eyes" rationale,75
and analogized the first hearing of indecent language to the first blow of an
assault-turning off the broadcast after the first hearing is as ineffective a
remedy as running away from an assault after the first blow.76 Based on
that statement by the Court in Pacifica, the FCC's November 2006 order
stated that isolated or fleeting expletives unfairly force viewers to take the
first blow.77
A second reason for regulating fleeting expletives concerns the
difficulty of determining what the word(s) mean in context. The FCC
suggests that an expletive's power derives from its sexual or excretory
meaning.78 Therefore, the argument follows that literal and non-literal use
of a word, e.g., "fuck," falls within the indecency regime because "it is
difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether a word is being used as
an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or excretory functions., 79 A
third reason offered by the FCC to support regulating fleeting expletives is
the concern that an exemption for fleeting expletives would "permit
broadcasters to air expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so
one at a time., 80 The FCC also reasoned that "categorically requiring
repeated use of expletives in order to find material indecent is inconsistent
with [their] general approach to indecency enforcement, which stresses the
critical nature of context. 81 In sum, the force of these reasons derives from
the meaning that the reasonable broadcast viewer would ascribe to an
expletive in context in order to find it indecent.
74. Id. at 457.
75. The Supreme Court, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), found that
those in a Los Angeles courthouse who did not care to be bombarded with the "Fuck the
Draft" message on Cohen's jacket should simply avert their eyes.
76. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
77. See Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 25.
78. See id at para. 23.
79. Id. at paras. 23, 58.
80. Id. at para. 25.
81. Id. at para. 23 (emphasis added).
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B. Case Studies and the Second Circuit's Rejection of the FCC
Rationales
Even though the FCC has hung its hat on the first blow theory since
Pacifica, the Second Circuit found it unpersuasive and incoherent when
considered along with their standard for finding indecency. The court of
appeals highlighted the inconsistency between the first blow theory and the
contextual analysis at the heart of the indecency policy. 82 During oral
argument, the FCC further undercut the first blow theory by stressing that it
does not take the position that any occurrence of an expletive is indecent.8 3
The tension between the first blow theory and the indecency policy is
demonstrated in the December 13, 2004 episode of "The Early Show" on
CBS, one of the four television shows at issue in Fox v. FCC.
84
The FCC struggled with how to evaluate "The Early Show" from
December 13, 2004. During a live interview, at approximately 8:10 a.m.
(EST), a cast member from "Survivor: Vanuatu" described a fellow cast
member as a "bullshitter.' '85 Based on the principal factors mentioned in the
Industry Guidance policy statement, the FCC's 2006 Omnibus Order
determined that the language was indecent because, in this circumstance,
the "S-Word" was vulgar, graphic and explicit, and it was shocking and
86 Atrte'gratuitous. After the Omnibus Order, Fox and CBS petitioned for review
by the Second Circuit, and the FCC moved for a voluntary remand which
resulted in the Order on Remand.87 The Order on Remand doubled back on
the Omnibus Order, deferring to the network's characterization of the
interview as a "news interview," not an entertainment program, and thus it
was not actionably indecent.8 8 The Second Circuit viewed the decision in
the Order on Remand, and the news exception, which the FCC emphasized
as broad at oral argument, as a flat contradiction to the first blow
rationale. 89
1. Issues with Demonstrative Indecency: Literal and Non-literal
Uses
Like "jerk" a century ago, implicit in the Second Circuit's rejection of
the FCC's second argument is the idea that the expletives "shit" and "fuck"
82. See id. at para. 15; Industry Guidance, supra note 19, at para. 9 (noting that full
context is critical to an indecency determination).
83. See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 458 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
84. Id. at 452.
85. See Omnibus Order, supra note 20, at para. 137; Order on Remand, supra note 3.
86. Omnibus Order, supra note 20, at para. 139, para. 141.
87. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 453.
88. Order on Remand, supra note 3, at paras. 72-73.
89. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458.
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are not demonstratively indecent under the current community standard.
This second argument stressed that a fleeting expletive may be regulated
because, despite the fact that "shit" and "fuck" have non-literal usages, it is
difficult or impossible to tell whether the usage is literal, and they are, after
all, expletives because of their literal meaning.90 Rejecting this argument,
the court of appeals found the rationale unsupported by record evidence
and contradicted by evidence from the Networks, and not simply the result
of a difference in opinion from the FCC's judgment.91 The court stated that
the FCC's rationale "defies any commonsense understanding of these
words, which, as the general public well knows, are often used in everyday
conversation without any 'sexual or excretory' meaning.'
92
To support its conclusion, the court of appeals provided several
illustrations of expletives used in a way that could not reasonably be
construed as referencing sexual or excretory organs or activities.93 A prime
example cited by the court is from the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, where
Bono, lead singer of the band U2, said, "this is really, really, fucking
brilliant, '94 during his acceptance of the award for best song in a movie.95
The court of appeals also included analogous colorful examples from
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.96 President
Bush, during the 2006 G8 summit in Russia, remarked to British Prime
Minister Tony Blair that the UN needed "to get Syria to stop doing this shit
... ,,97 The example from Vice President Cheney recounted the June 2004
exchange with Senator Patrick Leahy on the Senate floor where the former
told the latter, go "[f]uck yourself."98
2. From the Golden Globes to the Supreme Court
The fallout from the Golden Globes incident gave rise to FCC v. Fox
in the Supreme Court, and it also put a spotlight on the problem with the
discretion in the indecency policy. When the FCC's Enforcement Bureau
90. See id. at 459 (citing Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 23).
91. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 460 n.l0.
92. Id. at 459.
93. See id.
94. Complaints Against Various Brdcst. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859,
para. 2 (2003) [hereinafter Golden Globes Bureau Decision], rev'd by Golden Globes
Order, supra note 13.
95. See Phil Rosenthal, The Gold Rush Is On, CMCAGO SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2003, at 32
(the song was "The Hands That Built America" from Gangs of New York).
96. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 459.
97. See Paul Kent, Waging War for Lost Sons, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Australia), July 22,
2006, Features, Inside Edition, at 64.
98. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 459-60; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Salty Language
as Cheney andSenator Clash, N.Y. TiMEs, June 25, 2004, at AI8.
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reviewed Bono's incident at the Golden Globes, it found that "[t]he word
'fucking' may be crude and offensive, but, in the context presented here,
did not describe sexual or excretory organs or activities." 99 Moreover, the
Enforcement Bureau made clear that when offensive language is used as an
adjective to emphasize an exclamation (as Bono did) or it is used as an
insult (as President Bush and Vice President Cheney did), then it falls
beyond the scope of the indecency regime.' °
Following the 2003 Golden Globes, the Parents Television Council
filed numerous complaints with the FCC, and as a result, in March 2004,
the FCC flipped, announcing the fleeting expletives policy that essentially
held any utterance of "flick" indecent.'0 ' The Golden Globes decisions
demonstrate a troubling breadth of discretion and obscurity in the FCC's
determinations that speech is patently offensive by contemporary
community standards. The FCC's indecency analysis stresses the critical
importance of the "full context,"'02 and acknowledges the use of "fuck" as
an intensifier, but nevertheless concludes that, in any context, "fuck"
carries a sexual connotation bringing it within the scope of the indecency
regime.
1°3
The court of appeals made quick work of the FCC's floodgates and
contextual arguments, instead moving forward to the conclusion that the
lack of evidence supporting the mercurial fleeting expletives policy renders
it arbitrary and capricious. The FCC's floodgates argument was determined
to be "divorced from reality" because the FCC itself recognized in the
Order on Remand that fleeting expletives were rare even before Golden
Globes.' 4 Likewise, the FCC's argument that requiring repeated use of
expletives undercuts its contextual approach is dismissed for their own
paradoxical position that in a contextual analysis "fuck" and "shit" are per
se indecent.0 5 In sum, the Second Circuit found these rationales for the
amplification of the indecency policy an unreasonable departure from the
prior regime.'6 Moreover, the court found the FCC's policy "devoid of any
evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful," which it suggested
is particularly important today because there are so many more media
99. Golden Globes Bureau Decision, supra note 94, at para. 5.
100. See id.
101. See Golden Globes Order, supra note 13.
102. Id. at para. 7.
103. See id. at para. 8.
104. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1647 (2008); see also Order on Remand, supra note 3, at para. 29 (noting that
television networks' own policies do not allow any expletives at any time of day, and which
supports why even fleeting expletives are a rare occurrence).
105. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 460.
106. Id. at 461.
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outlets that may expose children to expletives than when the FCC began
sanctioning indecent speech. 0 7 The unreasonable rationales combined with
the lack of evidence led the court to decide that the FCC failed to meet the
reasoned basis required by State Farm.'08
C. The FCC's Appeal Hinges on Reasonableness, Not a Hard Look
In the Solicitor General's Petition and Brief for the Petitioners, the
court of appeals is rebutted with heavy reliance on Pacifica, and only
sparse reference to the APA and State Farm.1' 9 The Petition presented
colorful support for the first blow theory, suggesting that it does not require
the FCC to treat any first blow as a knockout punch in order to be relevant
in contextual analysis."0 Citing Pacifica, the FCC's Supreme Court Brief
highlighted the Court's characterization of the first blow theory and
Pacifica's suggestion that context could effect the weight of the first
blow."' Reference to the APA in the Petition, however, is limited to a
suggestion that the Act does not require consistent prohibition in all
contexts, and the absence of the same cannot be reconciled with Pacifica,
and is not necessarily unreasonable.12
The FCC's Supreme Court Brief actually states that contextual
distinctions justify the implementation of the fleeting expletives policy, but
the FCC did not offer any evidence of offensiveness or harm. 1 3 Citing
Judge Leval's dissent as support, the FCC's Supreme Court Brief urges that
the FCC's general observation that expletives cannot be divorced from
their sexual or excretory meaning is not irrational.' 4 Rather than provide
any evidentiary support for that proposition, the Petition cites a D.C.
Circuit case and a Supreme Court case, which suggest that such evidence is
not required to establish indecency or obscenity. 15 In this context, the
Petition frames the State Farm issue as a change in policy to better
implement § 1464, rather than an unreasonable departure from the prior
indecency policy.116
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21; see also Brief for the Petitioners,
supra note 24, at 21-27.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21, at 16.
111. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 24, at 32.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21, at 19.
113. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 24, at 28-29.
114. See id. at 34-35.
115. Id. at 39-41 (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968)).
116. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 21.
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Unfortunately, the FCC failed to consider the heart of the arguments
that cut against its position. While State Farm review for arbitrary and
capricious action is narrow, dismissing the relevance of evidentiary support
in the agency's decisions loses sight of the thrust of State Farm, which
requires a rational connection between the facts and the agency's
decision. 117 Also, while Pacifica and the First Amendment are certainly
relevant to the issue at hand, the extensive reliance on its arguments and
holding is misplaced given that the present question concerns
administrative law. In fact, the FCC's request that the Supreme Court
remand the case to consider the First Amendment issue along with the APA
issue 1 8 suggests awareness that the FCC's APA argument is thin. The FCC
gave little attention to the scope of arbitrary and capricious review, which
further highlights the need for Supreme Court guidance in the convoluted
indecency policy, and for evaluating arbitrary and capricious administrative
decisions more generally.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF A POLICY AT RISK
After recognizing that the fleeting expletives policy represents an
amplification rather than a subset of the FCC's indecency regime, it is clear
that judicial review of fleeting expletives carries broad implications for the
entire indecency policy. The arguments provided by the FCC in Fox v.
FCC highlight that fact, and also demonstrate rampant discretion buttressed
by general observations rather than facts. Those two considerations are
troubling both as an abuse of administrative power, and consequently, as
murky waters that stifle speech rather than provide meaningful guidance to
broadcasters. The Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Fox should clarify
the contours of administrative discretion in regulating indecency. Confining
the FCC to the limits of administrative discretion set forth in State Farm
will ease administration by the agency and will provide clearer notice to
broadcasters.
The FCC's argument fails to recognize that the Supreme Court's
arbitrary and capricious standard looks to reasons in relation to facts, and in
fleeting expletives regulation-and in indecency determinations
generally-facts are needed more than layers of rationales. In light of the
scope of the arbitrary and capricious review for a reasoned basis for an
agency's action outlined in State Farm, review of fleeting expletives, and
the Court's treatment of the FCC's reasons and methods for indecency
determinations, implicates the entire indecency regime directly or
indirectly. If the Court determines that methods and reasons for finding
117. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56
(1983).
118. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 24, at 42.
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fleeting expletives indecent represent a tinkering of the entire indecency
regime, then the decision should cause immediate ramifications to
indecency determinations generally. However, it is possible that the Court
will cordon off fleeting expletives from the larger indecency policy. But,
even if the Court adopts the latter approach, it should only delay a related
challenge to the indecency regime-either way, Fox v. FCC has exposed
the FCC's reasons and methods in enforcing § 1464 as thin in concrete
bases and thick with meandering discretion.
Of course, invalidating any portion of the indecency regime would
present a significant development-after all, this is the first case the Court
has heard on broadcast indecency since Pacifica."9 That creates a
predicament considering Chief Justice John Roberts's approach to creating
consensus with narrow decisions on hot issues. 20 Deciding on the lack of
factual basis for indecency determinations should strike that balance by
providing clearer guidance to broadcasters without gutting the FCC's
ability to regulate indecent speech. Incorporating a factual component into
the determination of contemporary community standards should provide
clarity to what constitutes indecent speech under § 1464, and should also
allow the policy to comport better with contemporary society. As noted
above, the determinations of speech as patently offensive by contemporary
community standards are reduced to general observations or nebulous
interactions between the FCC and different sectors of society. There are a
variety of ways for the FCC to cull facts regarding what is considered
indecent.1
21
The nature of arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm and
Baltimore Gas may result in a more or less deferential view, which should
probably correlate to the rigor of the corrective measures directed to the
FCC. In other words, if the Court upholds the Second Circuit by applying a
hard look at the FCC's actions using the factors enumerated by the Court in
State Farm, 22 then, that less deferential approach suggests more rigorous
adjustment in the FCC's policy. On the other hand, if the Court finds the
policy arbitrary and capricious under the more deferential approach from
Baltimore Gas discussed above, then perhaps a less rigorous fact finding
119. Robert Barnes and Frank Ahrens, Supreme Court to Review FCC Ban on Profanity,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2008, at A01.
120. Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST, May 21, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR20060
52100678.html.
121. See, e.g., TIMOTHY JAY, CURSING IN AMERICA: A PSYCHOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF
DIRTY LANGUAGE IN THE COURTS, IN THE MOVIES, IN THE SCHOOLYARDS AND ON THE
STREETS 141-47 (1992) (discussing studies where a sample set of people were asked to rate
the offensiveness of scores of words).
122. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43.
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would be required in indecency analysis. Whichever method the Court
applies, this case presents an opportunity for the Court to cut through the
Gordian knot of indecency rhetoric, which has led to the present swell of
cases and abuse of discretion elucidated by Fox v. FCC's treatment of
fleeting expletives.
250 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61
